
Exclusive:

CIA CAMPAIGN AGAINST VIETNAM

CovertAction INFORMATION BULLETIN



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EDITORIAL

In Bulletin Number 3 (January 1979) we analyzed the multifarious attacks which had been launched against the CovertAction Information Bulletin by the Agency and its friends, especially those in Congress. The campaign has been stepped up, both in frequency and in stridency, and it appears is being used as a smokescreen for the CIA's real thrusts: against a strong intelligence charter, against the Freedom of Information Act, and in support of the Bentsen bill—a bill which in the final analysis might strip journalists of their First Amendment rights vis-a-vis the CIA.

The continuing harassment has included another project of ours, Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa, due to be published in the fall. Last February, two of our group were in San Francisco for the National Lawyers Guild convention. Also attending was Kurt Groenewold, a wellknown lawyer from Hamburg, West Germany. Because Philip Agee lives in Hamburg, he had given Groenewold a long letter for us, reviewing various projects we were working on, particularly the book. When Groenewold arrived on his international flight in Seattle, Washington, he was taken aside by Immigration and Customs officials, and his briefcase, containing hundreds of pages of materials for the lawyers convention, as well as the letter from Agee, was taken from him. Only the Agee letter was removed from the briefcase, photocopied and returned, and the briefcase given back to Groenewold. That the Agency is aware of our projects is no surprise to us. That they would flaunt the obvious wiretapping which led to their knowledge of the delivery of the letter is somewhat surprising. And that they would cause the detention and harassment of a foreign lawyer whom they did not suspect of any offense is disturbing.


Turner and Carlucci on the Warpath

But the majority of attacks against CAIB have been verbal, and they have not involved underlings, but in fact the Director and the Deputy Director of the CIA themselves. In March, Admiral Turner gave a speech in Washington to the Johns Hopkins University Alumni Association. In it he chose to inveigh against Covert-Action, "headquartered just a few blocks from here." He had his facts a bit confused. First of all, he said we are a "slick" magazine. We try, but we're not all that slick. Then, more ominously, he announced that CovertAction is distributed "free, all over the world. I don't know where they get their money." This will be big news to the thousands of people who have paid for subscriptions or purchased CAIB on the newsstands.

Turner also made reference to the Welch case, intimating that his being exposed in a magazine had led to his death in Athens. Fortunately, there was a reader of Dirty Work in the audience. When he confronted Turner with the truth about the assassination of Welch, Turner—for the first time that we are aware of—admitted that perhaps the naming of Welch's name had nothing to do with his death; "but," he added, "that is irrelevant."

Finally, Turner made a most poignant comparison. He said that when we expose a young, highly trained and dedicated CIA officer, it is like taking a medical school graduate who has just become a surgeon, "and cutting his hands off."

On April 5, Deputy Director Frank Carlucci testified before the Subcommittee on Legislation of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to argue for the total exemption of the CIA from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act—even though the Act exempts from disclosure materials necessary to the national security. His argument was one of niggling sophistry. The FOIA does not pose any danger to the CIA, he agreed. The exemption provisions relating to national security are sufficient, and the Agency's FOIA staff are diligent. But, he pointed out, its sources and confidants around the world do not know this, or do not believe it. The application of the FOIA to the CIA causes these information sources to believe that they could be compromised, even though of course they could not. Therefore, Carlucci continued, the only answer to this



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dilemma is to remove the CIA from the provisions of the Act, so that the fears of sources and agents around the world, unfounded though they may be, would be eliminated. What the Agency really wants, obviously, is to insulate the Agency from the embarrassments legitimately exposed by the FOIA, totally unrelated to national security.

Although Carlucci was to testify about the FOIA, he took the opportunity to point out that "the difficulty in protecting intelligence information arises from more than the FOIA." He waived a copy of *CovertAction* at the Congress members. "This publication," he said, "is dedicated to exposing our undercover employees and operations overseas." But, he added, the Agency is "trying to deal" with it.

The next month, the Admiral was at it again. On May 10, Turner sent a long letter to Senator Lloyd Bentsen (R-Tex), supporting S. 191, the so-called Anti-Agee Bill, of which we have written before. Bentsen had the letter reprinted in the May 15 Congressional Record. In it we receive what amounts to a long, unsolicited testimonial. It is worth quoting at some length. He notes that we have published the names of "some 1200 alleged CIA personnel." He then says, "Security considerations preclude our confirming or denying specific instances of purported identification of CIA personnel. Suffice it to say that a substantial number of these allegations have been accurate." Of course, "substantial" is faint praise. Neither CovertAction nor Dirty Work has been challenged with respect to the accuracy of a single name.

It is Turner's description of the effects of our work which is most enlightening. He notes that "CIA's relations with foreign sources of intelligence have been impaired... Nearly all major foreign intelligence services with which we have liaison relationships have undertaken reviews of their relations with the Agency." He explains: "You can imagine the chilling effect it must have on a source who one day discovers that the individual with whom he has been in contact has been openly identified as a CIA officer." Of course he doesn't mention the effect it must have on an unwitting individual who thinks he has been dealing with a legitimate diplomat.

Finally, he gets to the heart of the matter. "The professional effectiveness of officers so compromised is substantially and sometimes irreparably damaged. They must reduce or break contact with sensitive covert sources. . . . Some CIA officers must be removed from their assignments. . . . Replacement of officers thus compromised is difficult and, in some cases, impossible."

Most recently, on June 20, Frank Carlucci was back on the trail. In a speech at the Secretary of State's "Open Forum" he devoted much of the address, entitled "Perspectives and Challenges for Intelligence," to yet another attack on *CovertAction*. He said that the CIA was working closely with the FBI, through a joint counter-intelligence task force, to "dry up" our sources.

Carlucci did have the perspicacity to admit that nothing we do is illegal; but it ought to be, he urged. This was yet another plug for the Bentsen bill.

What Ever Happened to the Charter?

Although all this attention might seem to be flattering, it is clear that the real thrust of this campaign is far more broad than it would seem on the surface. Turner and Carlucci are merely using the Bulletin as a vehicle. The real target is the proposed charter for the CIA. And in this the Agency has been extremely effective. Not long ago there was a strong movement for tight legislative reins on the CIA; although the reforms were not as substantial as they should be, they were a beginning. But recently, hopes for any meaningful reforms whatsoever appear doomed. The Agency has asserted control over the committees and their staffs. If there is a bill which reaches the floor, it will be to increase the Agency's powers—especially with regard to covert action—rather than to diminish them. The bills under discussion are nothing more than attempts to legitimize the illegal and immoral actions which have been the mainstay of Agency activity all along. At this point it would appear that no charter would be better than any which might get through Congress.

The likelihood of the Bentsen bill passing remains in question. The bill represents a direct challenge to whistleblowers in the government, and to legitimate journalists throughout the country. We hope it will not get far.

About This Issue

It is heartening and reassuring that Admiral Turner says that we are accurate and effective, and that Frank Carlucci says what we are doing is not illegal. We intend to live up to that praise. In this issue we feature several items relating to Vietnam, and the role of U.S. intelligence both during and after the war. The lead article on intelligence activities in Southeast Asia should serve to remind us not merely that the U.S. is a bad loser, but that ignominious defeat and world condemnation are not enought to remove the meddlers or eliminate their dirty work from any place.

We also include several articles on Scandinavia from contributors on the scene; excerpts from the speech of Maurice Bishop, Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government of Grenada denouncing attempts at destabilization in that country; and an exclusive report from a graduate of AIFLD's notorious courses for Latin American labor leaders. We also continue our regular features, including Naming Names, which in this issue documents 20 CIA officials undercover in 17 countries, including some rather elusive ones.

We hope that we are filling a need, and we continue to urge our readers to send us their comments and criticisms.

PROFILE OF US INTELLIGENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

by Larry Kilpatrick

In the aftermath of the US debacle in Indochina in April 1975, little has been written in the western media about that part of Asia which affected the US for more than two decades. Brief visits by a few Westerners to Vietnam and Laos have produced sketches of life there, but most stories about Indochina deal with refugees, their plight, and at times, their dubious accounts of the internal situation. Official US statements in early 1976 gave the impression that the US was actually "leaving" Southeast Asia.

The Situation Since the U.S. Defeat

Has this been the reality since April 1975? Actually, except for the unravelling of the client Thieu regime and the chaotic evacuation of US interests from Saigon, events and trends both within and without Indochina indicate that the US presence is much entrenched in Southeast Asia, especially with regard to its clandestine operations.

In April 1975, much of the CIA apparatus in South Wietnam was disrupted. Parts of it were moved to Thailand and to US bases in the Philippines. Under the shock of the Vietnamese spring offensive, the Thieu regime's gigantic police and intelligence machine—which the US took years to build-crumbled. According to Frank Snepp's Decent Interval, up to thirty thousand special police, CIA and Phoenix-related Vietnamese employees were left behind (p. 567). The Saigon CIA station—the largest in Asia managed to pull out only 537 of its 1900 Vietnamese (p. 566), including close to 1000 high-level Vietnamese who had built close relationships with the Agency over the years. One who left, for example, Tran Quoc Buu, was the oldest CIA agent in Vietnam, and the main trade union chief since the 50's. He exited Saigon on a "priority black" flight with his whole retinue of wives, children, and bodyguards. Tran Quoc Buu died recently in his McLean, Virginia home, and was given praise in the AFL-CIO's newsletter as one who had made important contributions to the fight against communism.

The CIA's other bases throughout South Vietnam, which operated under the cover of US consulates at the

time, succeeded in taking out most of their Vietnamese, totalling several thousand.

Clearly the most immediate problem in 1975-6 for the Ford administration lay in resettling all these suddenly unemployed CIA operatives—hundreds of them—as well as all the pre-1975 Vietnamese employees. A few high-level Agency officers stayed in Bangkok after the debacle to assist the station there in its intelligence gathering activities. But they eventually joined the rest of the operatives in retirement in 1977. Although Stansfield Turner's Halloween purge removed most of these Indochina operatives from the Clandestine Division, the Agency was nevertheless left with a trim, and no less effective, "black operations" and para-military capability. With advances made in electronic technology, and the increasing practice of sharing resources with other services, Turner's move signaled the end of the Agency's era of large-scale para-military operations in Southeast Asia.

Most of the CIA's Vietnamese employees fared well. Following resettlement in the US, a few hundred refugees have been working as translators, monitors of events in Indochina, and consultants to the Agency and to the Pentagon on Indochina. Most low-level CIA-related

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Larry Kilpatrick is the pseudonym for a long-time observer of US intelligence activities in Asia, especially Indocaina, well-known among the "Asia watchers" of the intelligence community.

refugees have been attached since 1976 to the HEW's Indochina refugee program, working throughout the US under the command of Americans who are either former Agency personnel or CORDS officers. (CORDS was predominantly a cover for the Agency's Operation Phoenix program to eliminate the NLF infrastructure.) This background indicates that the US has already set up in this country a similar network of Vietnamese agents designed to neutralize or eliminate Vietnamese suspected of pro-Hanoi views, and to build anti-Vietnam organizations of refugees. Nguyen Van Be, the former head of Saigon's Rural Development cadre program, now works for the HEW program, reporting on activities of various refugee organizations.

Working with the intelligence and counterinsurgency agencies of Southeast Asian governments are a small number of former Vietnamese officers of the Thieu regime's General Department of Political Warfare (GDPW). Established in the late 1950's under the guidance of CIA and counterinsurgency experts like Sir Robert Thompson, the GDPW borrowed its methods from all sources: from Agency experience in the Philippines with the Hukbalahap movement, from British counterinsurgency in Malaysia, from Goebbels' Nazi propaganda and psychological warfare techniques, and from tactics used by Chiang Kai-shek's command against the Chinese (Etudes Vietnamiennes, No. 42, p. 82). These Vietnamese assist the Thai government in suppressing the liberation movement in Northeast Thailand, and aid the Malaysian government as counterinsurgency advisors to the police forces. A key officer in the GDPW, Nguyen Ngoc Phach, who has a long association with the CIA, currently works for the Singapore intelligence service. which itself is an outgrowth of the British MI-6. Singapore has been for a long time a main center in Southeast Asia of the Agency's "black operations" and other clandestine activities against the Vietnamese revolutionary authorities.

Singapore and the CIA

A look at Singapore's background reveals some interesting facts. Singapore lies at the strategically important Straits of Malacca, a region where for many years there has been a convergence of US and British interests, and a strong coordination of intelligence activities vis-a-vis the rest of Southeast Asia.

The Agency's Singapore station has a long history of activities against Vietnam. In the mid-1950's and during the period of the CIA's efforts to prop up the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam, Singapore was the center for all "black propaganda" operations directed against Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh movement. When the French colonialists negotiated in Geneva with the Vietnamese, the Singapore station put on an all-out drive of activities including "black operations," to bolster the French position (Joseph B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, p. 169). At the same time the Philippines station in Manila was the jumping-off base for the Agency's sabotage and other clandestine activities in North Vietnam, according to the Pentagon Papers. In 1954, the establishment of the Diem regime by Edward Lansdale of the CIA was backed up by propaganda and clandestine operations out of Singapore (Smith, p. 178). It is common knowledge among intelligence observers of Southeast Asia that Singapore, the main business center of the area, is routinely used by Agency operatives with business covers on their way to their missions elsewhere in Asia.

With the withdrawal of the British military presence East of Suez several years ago, the Agency expanded its activities in Singapore, especially with a heightened US interest in Singapore following the closure of US bases in Thailand, and the establishment of US military and intelligence "transit" facilities there in the spring of 1978. At the present time, the Singapore station has developed a close working relationship with Singapore's intelligence



service, monitoring and analyzing events in Indochina, and of course cooperating in "black propaganda" operations.

Manila and the CIA

A post-1975 tour d'horizon of the CIA in Southeast Asia would not be complete without mention of the main station, and regional headquarters, Manila. The Agency's assets there are significant: it operates jointly with the Defense Intelligence Agency major electronic listening posts into Indochina and southern China, which provided most of the intelligence on the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979. This joint CIA/DIA structure, called the Strategic Warning Staff, is headquartered in the Pentagon and operates a number of similar posts all over the world. The Manila station includes also very sizeable logistics capabilities for a wide range of clandestine operations against the governments of Indochina.

In the mid-1950s, US bases in the Philippines were used as the headquarters for "Operation Brotherhood" in northern Vietnam, under the direction of Edward Lansdale and Lucien Conien, and involving CIA-trained Filipinos. During the US war in Vietnam, in addition to serving as military staging bases for the Air Force and the Navy, these bases were, according to reliable sources, logistics points for infiltration and exfiltration of specially trained Vietnamese agents and commandos into and out of Vietnam. According to these sources, US submarines would leave the Philippines with their agents, and drop athem along the coast of northern central Vietnam. The whole process of releasing Vietnamese agents took less than fifteen seconds. These submarine missions continued throughout the duration of the war.

In the post-1975 period, following the normalization of relations between Vietnam and the Philippines, US submarine drops apparently stopped. The joint Philippines-Vietnam communique at the time did call for a prohibition on the use of bases by a third country against Vietnam, and vice-versa.

Aside from the CIA's huge telecommunications installation—the Regional Relay Station—at Clark Air Force Base (the largest American military installation outside the continental US), there is at least one other vital installation in the Philippines. Located in Manila at the Seafront Compound about a mile from the US Embassy is the socalled "Regional Service Center." Though ostensibly under the auspices of the International Communication Agency, this ultra-modern printing facility functions as a part-open ICA and part-secret CIA propaganda plant. With the ability to produce large quantities of high-quality color offset magazines, posters, leaflets and the like in at least 14 Asian languages, its output during the Vietnam War earned it a plaque with thanks from the Department of Defense for its contribution to the overall psychological warfare effort. One source in Manila has stated that the RSC was the source of counterfeit Vietnamese piasters which were airdropped in Vietnam. Officers from the CIA's Technical Services Division are known to maintain close liaison with the RSC, which still operates today in Manila.

In the post-Vietnam war period the regional headquarters in Manila generally has increased in importance as a major listening post into the Indochina peninsula.

US Policy and Intelligence Activities Since 1975

Since April 1975, US policies toward Vietnam have reflected a strong current of hostility toward the Vietnamese revolutionaries, with a brief interruption in the first few months of 1977.



David Sute

In the last year of the Ford administration, the US sought to conduct a massive program of economic warfare and to mount a campaign to isolate Vietnam diplomatically. Aside from the official embargo against Vietnam and Kampuchea, the US applied pressure on Thailand's Thanin regime to economically blockade Laos, a landlocked country which had extensive trade with Thailand for years, thus forcing Vietnam to divert food resources to assist Laos. Two specific areas of economic warfare that the US has concentrated on deal with scientific and technological information, and development of oil resources. Under Kissinger's initiative, US missions around the world sought to prevent the cooperation and contracts

made by Western countries and Japan—paricularly the latter—in Vietnam's petroleum development.

The range of clandestine operations programmed to support US hostility toward Vietnam basically falls into two categories. The first one includes tactical, short-term operations that attempt to disrupt every aspect of life in revolutionary Vietnam. The second set of activities relates to the strategic policies of "Balkanization" of Indochina, and of preventing Vietnam's emergence as an economic power in Southeast Asia.

From the vast number of Vietnamese refugees who were former paratroopers, special forces and rangers, came recruits who after some brief training were sent back to Thailand for infiltration into Vietnam. Favorite infiltration routes were through southern Laos by low altitude night drops, and through the Gulf of Thailand by boat. As during the Vietnam war, few of these commandos ever returned, and their missions were singularly unsuccessful. Their objectives at the time were to agitate ethnic and religious groups, which had a long association with the US presence in South Vietnam.

In central Vietnam, a few ethnic Montagnard elements, which used to belong to the Fulro movement (the so-called National Movement for Autonomy) and were trained by the US Special Forces, organized themselves in guerrilla squads, attacking Vietnamese troops and supply bases. Further south, in the Mekong delta province of An Giang and the area of the Seven Mountains, pro-US elements of the Hoa Hao religious sect conducted similar activities. From the fall of 1976, Radio Hanoi and the Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army Daily) often carried detailed stories of Vietnamese security forces' fight against these elements which received support from US imperialist agents on the outside.

According to sources who had knowledge of some 1976 operations, US-trained agents also attacked reeducation camps where high-level political warfare and intelligence members of the Thieu regime were held. Revolutionary authorities eventually had to move a few camps. An active covert program attempted to assist members of the Thieu regime to escape from the camps and flee Vietnam. The CIA had, according to the same sources, boats stationed along the Vietnamese coast ready to pick up only these escapees. Other Vietnamese boat refugees were ignored. However, this operation also ended in dismal failure.

Even before the US defeat in 1975, the Agency had planted in South Vietnem a network of women saboteurs and spies. "Thien nga" in Vietnamese characterizes a Vietnamese woman spy trained by and in the pay of US imperialism. The "Thien nga" network apparently operated in South Vietnam's cities, and was the subject of several articles in the spring of 1977 in Quan Doi Nhan Dan; the arrest of the Thien Nga network having occurred sometime in 1976. The existence of this operation, however, has been an open secret for a long time, especially among old Agency Vietnam hands like Don Rockland—a key figure in the clandestine and black propaganda activities against Vietnam out of Saigon;

Bill Reardon of Camp Peary; and Ted Shackley, the former Laos Chief of Station and Head of the East Asia Division. Trained in the early 1970's in the US, these "Thien nga" dribbled back into South Vietnam life under the Theiu regime about the time of the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement.

The Agency also initiated a smaller operation involving a number of Buddhist monks who had visited the United States on various programs during the Vietnam war, but again this operation was without much success, as most of these would-be agents turned out to be totally corrupt, even by CIA standards.

An assessment made of the range of the Agency's clandestine operations described above, shows they were basically a hodge-podge of dead-end activities which already had been tried by the French colonialists following the loss of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. A French officer named Trinquier sought at that time to organize guerrilla units among the ethnic minorities in northern Tonkin against Ho Chi Minh's victorious Viet Minh forces, but the whole effort was eventually crushed.

Much more lethal were clandestine operations implemented in support of US strategic objectives of "Balkanization" of Indochina and of the economic containment of Vietnam. Under the leadership of Kissinger, these



strategic operations dominated the covert side of US policies not only in Southeast Asia, but in areas considered vital to US interests, like Africa and the Middle East.

Relations With Chinese Intelligence


Following the Nixon administration's opening to China in 1971, the US government found a new partner in China to develop its strategic operations. While the policy of "Balkanization" of Indochina calls for a permanent state of war between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea based on ethnic and border differences (at one point for a permanently divided Vietnam) and may reflect some divergence in long-term US and Chinese objectives, US and Chinese interests for the time being have been and are, if not on a parallel course, then at least converging. The content of the Shanghai Communique, other Chinese and US policy statements, and moves by both parties since that time, provide the clearest record of these parallel interests.


According to reliable Agency sources, Kissinger laid the foundation in 1971, during his visit to Peking, for a basic strategic intelligence exhange agreement with the Chinese. At the time, what concerned China's leadership most was the Soviet Union's massing of troops at the border and their deployment. Kissinger's nagging problem was to find a solution to the war in Indochina. Sources who have had access to the content of these US-China "consultations," and to some high-level meetings during the Carter administration, have indicated that out of Kissinger's basic agreement with the Chinese grew a whole range of intelligence exchange and working understandings, covering areas of the world where both parties have parallel interests. Sino-US exchange agreements have linked US intelligence and clandestine operations in Africa to Chinese intelligence operations in Indochina. It was fairly common knowledge among intelligence people that following the US demise in Kampuchea in 1975, the two main sources of intelligence in Phnom Penh for the US came from the Chinese and Egyptian missions. Although sources were not able to confirm that an intelligence trade-off had been made between the parties involved, those sources familiar with such exchanges suspect the other side of the coin has been some type of intelligence on Middle East developments from the US to them.


In Indochina, covert US operations in support of Balkanization include the long-term penetration of the Communist parties of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, and their mass organizations; the fostering, directly and indirectly, of ethnic, regional and border problems which would lead to constant turmoil and war within Indochina; and dirty tricks in the area of economic warfare.

In Kampuchea, the Agency's efforts at penetration were particularly unsuccessful due to the Pol Pot regime's drastic mass killings within the Kampuchean Communist party. The US did however succeed in planting the seeds for a border dispute between Vietnam and China in 1974 by manipulating the Thieu regime's moves in the clash with China over the Paracels Islands, and creating the conditions for China's takeover of those islands. The Paracels Islands today are indeed a main point of contention in the present Vietnam-China conflict, as exemplified by the naval build-up of forces on both sides since January 1979.

Overall, because of the strength of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement which has undergone for four decades brutal assaults by Japanese fascists, French colonialists, Chinese warlords and American imperialists, and has emerged strong and battle-tested, most US strategic covert operations have failed to advance the administration's Balkanization policy.







However, in the post-1975 period, the US government has found a new proxy policeman. Every significant covert operation which had been hatched by the French and later the US now appears to be the domain of the Chinese intelligence service. Jean Lacouture, a journalist long associated with French state interests and an Indochina veteran, recently made appropriate comments about the Chinese role in Indochina: "The visit to Peking of the principal traditional leader of the Meos, Vang Pao, who for a long time was manipulated by the Americans, has been one of the first successes of the Chinese intelligence service's policy of undermining Vietnam. This was soon followed by the reawakening of the Fulro, a creation of American agents, which in March 1975 partially defected to Hanoi's side and thus became one of the causes of the Thieu regime's crumbling. Today, whatever is left of the Fulro, under Chinese impetus, seems to agitate again against Vietnam.




In this realm also, Peking has succeeded Washington" (Le Nouvel Observateur, March 5, 1979).

Other operations picked up by the proxy policeman of the East include the Pol Pot guerrilla forces in Kampuchea, backed up by hundreds of para-military Chinese advisors, and the recent Chinese creation of the Laotian Socialist Party in southern China to undermine the Laotian revolution.

Conclusion

Today, the three countries of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea face not only the continued hostile policies of the US government, but also the aggressive policy and activities of Chinese reactionaries who are willing defenders of US interests in the region. From this strategic power realignment more combined Sino-US covert operations will develop in Southeast Asia as both the US and China attempt to strengthen their "parallel interests." The aim of such Sino-US operations against the three revolutions of Indochina is the same as during the Vietnam war: an attempt to crush the Indochinese revolutionary movements, and in particular the Vietnam revolution. Basic realities show, however, that the US government was forced to find a new proxy to implement its policies following its failure in 1975. And, despite enormous difficulties, the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have consolidated their revolutions. It is reasonable to conclude that this Sino-US partnership in aggression against Indochina will also fail. The only question is when.



VIETNAM WAR ON DANISH SOIL

The following article is from the International Information Center on Imperialism and the Capitalist State, in Copenhagen, Denmark. It represents one chapter of their recently published "Under Daekle" ("Under Cover"), and is reprinted here with their permission. Persons wishing further information may write them at: DOK-IIC, Postbox 2038, 1012 Copenhagen K, Denmark.

On June 6th-8th, 1969, 88 delegates and 72 guests met "somewhere in the liberated areas" for the Peoples Congress in what was formerly South Vietnam. The Congress unanimously voted to proclaim the Republic of South Vietnam and to form the Provisional Revolutionary government (PRG) with the intention "to create independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and the peaceful reunification of Vietnam."

Only one year later—on July 2nd 1970—PRG opened an information office in Copenhagen.

Rats Desert the Sinking US Ship

During Tet, the Vietnamese New Year, of 1968 the peoples war in South Vietnam entered its third and decisive phase—the offensive phase. In the course of only two days 240 major towns and bases were being attacked and the US Army and the Vietnamese puppet army suffered a major defeat. At the same time the airborne warfare over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) implied such heavy losses for the US Air Force that the United States on March 31st was forced to declare a "limited bombing halt" over the DRV. The United States was forced to start negotiations: The Paris Talks commenced on May 23rd 1968.

The liberation front, FNL, had now completely taken over the intitative. On Sunday, January 23rd 1969, the FNL initiated the second Tet Offensive and once more the opponents were caught unaware. In the United States the popular resistance grew in proportion with the increasing numbers of Vietnamese victories: Protest marches became a daily occurrence. The university students staged sit-ins, teach-ins, and moratoria. The workers demonstrated against war production. The women's organizations demanded the boys home. War weariness spread. The armed forces were increasingly demoralized and the number of desertions grew steadily. Confronted with this pressure at home Nixon was in July 1969 forced to launch the idea of "Vietnamization of the war." One by one the "allies" of the United States dropped out and the PRG offered to grant the troops safe conduct out of Vietnam. As a last desperate measure Nixon and the Nobel Prize winner Henry Kissinger decided to extend the war to the whole of Indochina. Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea (Cambodia) were subjected to terror bombardments. But developments could not be stopped and the answer came promptly: On April 24th-25th the Indochinese conference was called on the intitiative of the leader of FUNK, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk.

Four delegations took part in the Conference led by:

Pham Van Dong Prime Minister

of DRV

Nguyen Huu Tho President of FNL

and leader of PRG's Council. Today minister in the Socialist Republic

of Vietnam.

Souphannouvong President of Neo Lao

Haksat, the revolutionary government

of Laos.

Norodom Sihanouk

Leader of the national unity front of Kampuchea,

FUNK.

A unanimous Indochinese common front was created firmly decided on "defeating the American imperialists and their followers . . . so that Indochina may become an independent and peaceful area . . ."

A Bitter Taste

In the NATO-country Denmark the developments were followed with increasing anxiety. The times were over when Per Haekkerup! could swing his lash over a Sara Lidman² and without any shame at all confess to the US anti-communist crusade in Vietnam. The Social Democrats were now represented in the leadership of the organization Vietnam 69. The president of DASF3, Anker Jorgensen⁴, sharply turned against the US warfare and large parts of the Trade Union movement were behind the demand for "peace in Vietnam." On November 15th, 1969, The Danish Vietnam Committees gathered more than 25,000 demonstrators in Copenhagen under the slogans "USA out of Vietnam," "Fight American Imperialism," and "NATO out of Denmark." Public opinion was changing in favour of the liberation movements. The pressures from below were too much for the VKR-government⁵. And what about the pressures from above? Danish commercial interests in South East Asia, SAS, A.P. Moller, OK, Kampsax, F.L. Smidth⁶? He who swaps horses in midstream gets his feet wet.

In other words the problem was to change sides quickly in an attempt to secure future orders.

The demand of the Vietnam movement that the PRG be recognized could no longer be ignored. Foreign Secretary Poul Hartling squirmed and raved about "legal and factual recognition." But the permit was granted: On July 1st, 1970, PRG officially opened its information office at Amalievej no. 4 in Frederiksberg. The NATO partner Denmark had recognized the American defeat. As a last gesture towards the United States and the Danish "Cold Warriors", editor Henning Jensen⁸ was granted permission to open an information office for the junta in Saigon on November 27th, 1970.


The representatives of PRG were now physically in Copenhagen—without diplomatic status, however—but with permission to reside and work and with the rights to run an information office.

The Exposure

On March 14th, 1972, the PRG Information Office was meticulously searched by activists from the Danish Vietnam Committees, DDV, and two radio transmitters were found—both in the residential quarters on the first floor.

The transmitter in the living room had been mounted in an electric socket and connected to the main electricity supply and was thus constantly functioning. The transmitter in the dining room had been placed in a hollow wooden block glued under a buffet table. The apparatus, which was powered by a battery, was activated by speech, so that it started only when there was speech in its vicinity. This transmitter was an older American model with a working voltage corresponding to eighteen 1.5 V cells and with an estimated range of no more than 200 meters.

Both transmitters were "made in USA", but what was the nationality of the "plumbing gang"?



Amalievej no. 4

Shortly after PRG had applied for the lease, the flat had been inspected by a pair of presentable Danish speaking gentlemen, who pretended to be interested in obtaining the flat. After PRG had bought the flat, but before the rooms had been taken into actual use, the plumbing gang turned up—this time disguised as electricians. It cannot have taken the agents many minutes to install the prefabricated elements hiding the transmitters. The actual positioning of the transmitters was closely connected to the kind of information in which the CIA took an interest.

The living room was used for meetings with prominent guests: ambassadors of the socialist countries and representatives of the political parties and the trade unions as well as for less formal social gatherings with friends from the left wing. The dining room was also used as a living room by the Vietnamese outside working hours and was the place where guests, who enjoyed their special confidence, were entertained.

On the other hand no transmitters had been placed in the office on the ground floor, where only routine information activities took place.

Of special interest to the Americans was information concerning:

- opening of PRG information offices in other countries
- demonstrations planned by or assisted by the information office (PRG has never arranged demonstrations in Denmark, but representatives of the PRG have discussed previous and future demonstrations with activists)
- any topic discussed after office hours. (Apart from information concerning Danish citizens and Danish matters obtained by CIA in this manner, CIA has undoubtedly received information of military value: The leader of the Information Office regularly visited GDR where he was informed about the military situation. This information he passed on to his colleagues—and thus also to Pentagon).

All discussions were recorded on tape, transported to the American Embassy and typed. Vietnamese texts were translated by a female interpreter. From the embassy information was passed on to CIA's headquarters in Langley, USA, where it was processed and passed on to Pentagon, Saigon, and probably also to our local intelligence corps.

The actual monitoring took place at Kastanievej no. 5 just behind the Information Office.



Interland Marketing Research

Kastanievej no. 5 is owned by a psychiatrist himself occupying ground floor. The first floor consisted of a bathroom and two rooms of which one was let to three Spaniards and the other to "Interland Marketing Research" and its staff of three Americans.

To the landlord the three Americans explained that Interland Marketing Research was "a firm investigating the financial liquidity of companies and that the European headquarters was situated in Frankfurt a.M." But what the landlords could not know was that a company of this name was and is unknown in that line of business—in Copenhagen as well as in Frankfurt. It was not registered in the Company Register and did not even have a telephone. In other words a rather primitive cover-up firm, which instead of collecting information concerning the financial liquidity of companies collected information concerning the activities of PRG and its Danish liaison.

The Agent Network

Until September 5th three Americans lived at Kastanievej no. 5:

Butchiwitz:

approximately 30 years old in 1970.

Moleahy:

approximately 30 years old. Son of a professor from Washington, DC. He succeeded Butchiwitz but had to return home after only one week due to the death of his father. His second cover name was Patrick Matthews, while his real name was Patrick McHugh (or McCue). McHugh has since settled in California.

Bullock:

approximately 23 years old. Arrived at the end of November 1970 as a somewhat delayed replacement for Moleahy. His cover name was Marcus C. Polasek. Bullock started studying law at Houston University in October 1971 and has apparently left the service of CIA.

Instructions

The monitoring equipment, which was kept in a large sea chest, had to be supervised 24 hours a day. Especially important was the supervision after office hours. The agent was not to leave the room as long as the Vietnamese were at the Information Office, and only when he knew that they were leaving Copenhagen, he had a little time off. To get a look at the Information Office he had to go to the toilet. With a telescopic lens the agent might have secured pictures of amongst others Mogens Camre⁹ and the present chairman of the parliament K.B. Anderson, when the second anniversary of PRG was celebrated at a reception in the garden. The agent was also supposed to keep a log of all discussions he thought might be of particular interest for CIA.

The contact with CIA was maintained through three agents belonging to the embassy agent staff. "Russ," "Vaughn," and "Dave." At frequent intervals, the agent was collected in a car and driven around the city until the log, the tapes, and other information and instructions had been exchanged. The agent was then dropped and the "embassy official" drove back to the embassy having ensured that possible followers had been shaken off. The tapes were handed in, translated, typed, etc., as described earlier.

If any problems occurred, the field agent could contact the embassy agent by phone: During office hours on TRia 2822—a secret number belonging to the American Embassy. The telephone was situated on the second floor in Dag Hammerskjold's Alle no. 24—possibly in room 327. Outside office hours on TRia 225—"Dave's" private telephone.

The Listening Post Is Moved

On August 19th Bullock went to "Frankfurt." After a couple of weeks he returned and paid rent for the whole of September, but already on September 5th he moved the whole office. He explained to the landlords that he was moving to Norrebro¹0—close to Norrebro Station—in order to be closer to his home. Unfortunately, none of the agents took the trouble to register with the Registry Office (for this reason there is an uncertainty as far as the spelling of their names is concerned) so we do not know where they moved or if they did move at all, if it was no longer worth while to continue monitoring, or if they felt themselves "blown," or whether Bullock was replaced by another agent.

In cases where intelligence can not be obtained through normal sources, secret operations are staged. In NATO countries mostly in cooperation with or with the understanding of the local intelligence corps and through the assistance of summoned experts working without any official link with the embassy. The leading officers of the PRG-monitoring were "Dave," "Russ," and "Vaughn."

Dave

Harper, David A. Hardangergade 4, 1. th., 2100 Copenhagen 0 (01) TRia 225

Married to Liz Harper, who speaks Chinese and Spanish. During the World Bank meeting in Copenhagen in September 1970 she worked as secretary/interpreter.

Asked why she took the job she replied that a young diplomat does not earn very much and that she thus was merely supplementing her husband's income.

Dave arrived in Denmark in 1970 as an attache-Junior Secretary-in the political department, probably in room 327. Among his tasks were taking care of contact with Danish youth organizations and reporting their activities to CIA. Apart from being "head agent," i.e., leading officer in the monitoring of the PRG Information Office, he especially made himself conspicuous through his persistent attempts to infiltrate a number of Danish youth organizations active in international campaigns. One of these was Internationalt Forum¹¹, IF. Harper went to IF's office in Kompagnistraede and said "that he had just dropped in because he thought" that IF sounded interesting, and that he might find like-minded people there. He was the youngest official at the embassy and did not get on well with the "old fools there." Therefore he wanted to know what IF "was doing." He reappeared in March 1971 during the visit of the Brazilian resistance leader Apolonio de Carvalho's visit to Copenhagen and said that he had been ordered to present an analysis of the attitude of Danish youth organizations to the USA before May 1st. He went so far as to invite some of the members to "a homelike gathering" where the international contacts of IF were to be discussed and in order to promise the organization support in the form of typewriters, office articles, paper, etc. Only he could not offer cash, "but anything else was all right." On April 14th, 1971, IF organized an ISMUN (International Students Movement of the United Nations) conference in Elsinore. Again, Dave was on the spot-this time wanting information concerning IF's relations to other organizations and how the then planned study tour to Cuba was to take place. He was surprisingly well informed about IF's economic situation. Among other things he knew that IF had applied for and been granted 1,000 DKr. from OK and that a joint Scandinavian application for DKr. 40,000 had been turned down due to a Finnish veto.

Finally he was very interested in getting information about which members of the VKR government supported IF's and World University Service's (WUS) joint application for medical assistance for a group of former Brazilian prisoners then staying in Chile. This application was a result of Carvalho's visit to Denmark.

After the ISMUN conference Harper again contacted IF to get information about how the conference had proceeded. Especially, he was interested in the names of the American delegates. As part of the extension of international understanding, Dave at a very early stage offered to put IF in touch with the new second man at the Chilean Embassy. Unfortunately for Dave, he could not make any use of this contact during the Junta coup 2 years later—as he had then already been in Rwanda for a long time.

In 1970 Harper was invited as a guest to participate in the Conservative Students national meeting. "Privately," he knew many members of this organization. These contacts he utilized to obtain quite a lot of information about the left wing, which the conservative students knew from elsewhere. One of his best informants was the former

International Secretary of Dansk Ungdoms Faellesrad (DUF)¹², then a student of economics, Lars Christensen—member of Conservative Students. We know that he gave telephone numbers and other information about prominent members of DUF's member organizations and that it was probably he who briefed Dave about the economic situation of IF.

Dave took his work very seriously: His car—a light blue Mercedes Benz with the registration no. AD 76.564 CD—could regularly be seen in the streets of Copenhagen crossing red traffic lights at full speed. Then one could know that Dave was out performing his duties. As a disciplined and well trained agent he went through all security precautions ensuring that he was not being shadowed. If he were to collect one of the agents in the field, be it Butchiwitz, Moleahy, or Bullock, it always took place in the same manner: He entered his car after first having looked across his shoulder, started and drove away



at a tremendous speed. If there was any possibility for doing it, he preferred to cross red traffic lights. He never drove directly to his destination but made detours along suitable side roads trying to shake off any followers. If in spite of all his manoeuvres he still felt himself shadowed he would quickly pull in to the side and go somewhere where he could survey the situation and watch developments. If they were still on to him he would return to the embassy and try again some other time. Sometimes he changed cars. At some destination a car was parked—rented or brought by the resident agents. This car could not be traced back to the embassy but had on the other hand the disadvantage that it had no CD in the registration number and was thus not subject to diplomatic immunity. But possible impertinent questions from petty police officers could probably be evaded by showing an ID-card from the embassy.

Unfortunately, this colorful person as already mentioned is no longer with us. His cover was "blown" and he was called back to the State Department in the United States and then stationed in Rwanda, which probably still is benefitting from his special qualifications.

Russ

Miller, Russel F. Tuborgvej 100, 2900 Hellerup, telephone (01) HE 7518 Married to Charlotte Miller.

Russ came to Denmark at the end of 1968 or in the beginning of 1969 and has since worked as an attache in the political department in room 327. We do not know anything about him, except that he was one of the leading officers of the field agents at Kastanievej and that his way of driving a car is not substantially different from Dave's. Russ had on the other hand two cars at his disposal in which to show his talents: A light brown Ford Custom AD 76.744 and a blue Opel Kadett Caravan with a roof rack. Both cars were registered as CD cars.

Vaughn

Sherman, Vaughn A.

Ravnsnaevej 103, 3460 Birkenrod, telephone (01) 81 12 42 Born on October 1st 1927. Married to Eunice E.Sherman. 1945-46 in the navy. 1947-50 biologist in the Department of the Interior. 1952-57 army scientist. Since 1957 in the State Department.

Vaughn has previously been stationed in Stockholm and Madrid and has been living in Denmark since the autumn of 1969 attached to the Political Department in room 327 as an attache. He was the one of the three to stay here the longest. In 1973 he was the only one left of the original leading officers.

If he were to collect tapes, logs etc. from Kastanievej it would take place by means of a green Opel Caravan, AD 76.266, or a red Volks Wagen, AD 76.338, both registered as CD cars.

Notes

- 1. Per Haekkerup, leading Danish right-wing Social Democrat, former Foreign Secretary and Finance Minister in different Social Democratic governments in the sixties and seventies. Present Minister for Economic Coordination in the Danish government.
- 2. Sara Lidman, Swedish poet, wrote in favour of the liberation front during the Vietnam War as an active member of the solidarity committees. Per Haekkerup was very outspokenly against the first Danish demonstrations against US imperialism in Vietnam in 1964 and later. The text refers to his attacks on the Vietnam movement and Sara Lidman in particular.
- 3. DASF (Dansk Arbejdsmands-og Specialarbejder Forbund, the Danish general workers trade union.
- 4. Anker Jorgensen, Danish Prime Minister 1972-73 and 1975-. Formerly president of DASF 1968-72. Social Democrat.
- 5. VKR-government, Liberal-Conservative coalition government in Denmark 1968-71.
- 6. SAS (Scandanavian Airlines System).
- OK (East Asiatic Company). Large Danish Shipping Company. Kampsax, major civil engineering company with many international assets and interests.
- F.L. Smidth, large manufacturer of cement and cement production plants. Operates on the international market.
 - A.P. Moller, large Danish shipping company.
 - All are Danish owned multinationals with interests in South East Asia.
- 7. Poul Hartling, former leader of the conservative party "Venstre" and Foreign Secretary in the VKR-government 1968-74. Prime Minister 1974-75. Presently UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
- 8. Henning Jensen, well known Danish right-wing extremist. Has been known to cooperate with police intelligence against left-wing groups. It is from the circles around Henning Jensen that many of the infiltrators sent into left-wing organizations by police intelligence were recruited as well as the people who were recruited to steal membership files from leftist organizations. Has also been known to cooperate with CIA and has received money from CIA.
- 9. Mogens Camre, member of parliament for the Social Democrats. Was formerly known to have left-wing sympathies but is now generally known to be right-wing after having fallen in line with party discipline.
- 10. Norrebro, district near centre of Copenhagen.
- 11. Internationalt Forum (IF) is the Danish United Nations Union's youth organization.
- 12. DUF is the joint organization for most Danish youth organizations, political and "non-political".

SWEDES WARN US EMBASSY: STOP ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

by George Lennox

When US ambassador RODNEY O. KENNEDY-MINNOT arrived at the Swedish Foreign Office late in February to receive what the Swedes described as a "serious protest" it was generally felt that it came five years too late. The Swedes were protesting against the illegal intelligence activities of the Embassy's CIA staff during 1965 to 1973.

The protest was made after the discovery of confidential documents and letters from the US Embassy found in the flat of a senior policeman from the aliens department of Stockholm's Police Headquarters.

Police Commissioner Hans Melin was arrested on the 4th February by the Swedish security police (SAPO). Melin's arrest came after months of close scrutiny by SAPO who had suspected him of "freelancing" for Iraqi intelligence.

Finally on February 4th SAPO's months of telephone tapping, mail opening and close surveillance paid off. Melin was caught red-handed exchanging secret files on Iraqi and Palestinian refugees for three thousand dollars in cash with an Iraqi "Foreign Official" who had flown in from Baghdad the same day.

It is not clear whether Melin had the same monetary agreement with the CIA but what is clear is the fact that he was routinely passing classified personal files on American deserters who had come to Sweden to escape from fighting in Vietnam. The information from these personal files was certainly valuable to the CIA. When a deserter came to Sweden and asked for political asylum he was first interrogated in depth by the police from Melin's department. Specific details of his escape route to Sweden were recorded. And of course this was immediately passed on to the CIA. It is therefore not surprising that in the early seventies deserters had problems coming to Europe.

Details of deserters were not the only thing to interest the CIA during this time. From information contained in the material found at Melin's flat the CIA were asking for details of Swedes who were active within the Vietnam movement. Apparently it is this which has really upset the Swedish authorities the most. As one conservative reporter put it during a recent press conference, "it's alright for the CIA to want to have information about their own people, but to spy on us Swedes, that is too much." The reporter reflected a well known, but unpublished, fact. "To exchange an apple for a pear," is how the Swedes put it. In short it is the mutual exchange of intelligence between the CIA and the SAPO. The "apples" here were the deserters. What the "pears" were is guesswork.

At the time Sweden was very much against the American involvement in Vietnam. Sweden was the first Western country to officially support Hanoi and the Vietnam movement here was one of the single biggest political developments to have taken place. The deserters played an important role within the movement. They formed an American Deserters Committee which campaigned effectively from a leftist political standpoint. It was this committee which was the main target of the CIA. And it was here that Hans Melin helped the CIA to infiltrate two of their own agents under cover as deserters. The Swedish Press in the late sixties and early seventies wrote many stories of "alleged" CIA activty within the ADC. One such story featured two Americans who suddenly appeared in 1971 with their pockets full of hash and dollars. Shortly after their arrival many of the deserters were appearing at press conferences with huge joints in their hands. This did not go down too well with the politically-minded Swedes. Not surprisingly the image of the deserter soon turned

The two 'deserters' were eventually neutralized by the more active members of the ADC in a press expose. Michael Vale and Bill Jones are their names and whether or not they were in fact officially CIA is still not clear. However, after the press expose, they left Sweden for Wiesbaden in West Germany where they became active in the European Labour Committee. Melin denies that what he did was criminal. He considers it as part of the normal interchange of information between two friendly countries with the same political ideals. The press here have written that this is probably true and speculate further that Melin was probably not alone in passing information to the CIA. They even suggest that it is going on right now.

If that is the case why should the Swedes come with the "serious protest?"

Perhaps the official statements made shortly after the protest given to the US Ambassador will help us to understand the reason a little better.

On TV the same night the Swedish Foreign Minister desperately tried to play down the incident. He said that the people concerned had left the country and that since the US Embassy had stopped such activities he did not think that it would affect the "good relations" which now exist between Sweden and America.

Maybe. The fact remains however, that after Melin was arrested on February 4th three Iraqi diplomats were ordered immediately out of Sweden. The Swedes could hardly keep quiet when they knew that at Melin's trial the documents and letters from the US Embassy and found at his flat would be used as evidence.

Again, on the surface at least, the Swedes must be seen to be neutral.

GRENADA DENOUNCES DESTABILIZATION CAMPAIGN

On March 13, 1979, the people of the Caribbean island of Grenada decisively and bloodlessly overthrew the corrupt and vicious regime of Eric Gairy. The People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada was established, with former opposition leader and New Jewel Movement founder Maurice Bishop as Prime Minister. Immediately, the United States began to put pressure on the new government, particularly over the likelihood of friendly relations between Grenada and Cuba. Economic devastation was threatened; other retaliation was merely hinted at. Less than two months later an incident of double arson occurred, demonstrating that violent adestabiliztion, as practiced in Chile and in Jamaica, was a real possibility. The Prime Minister chose to take the offensive, in a radio speech to the nation. If the people know destabilization for what it is, he pointed out, they cannot be fooled by it. What follows are excerpts from that speech.



Sisters and Brothers of Free Grenada,

On Sunday last, the 6th May, elements opposed to our Revolution moved to a new and higher level in their attempts to discredit and destroy our Revolution. When the news came that two fires, set within one hour of each other, had burnt down a Carifta cottage at Morne Rouge in the heart of our tourist belt, and a building on Church Street in the heart of the capital of our country, this would have come as no surprise to those Grenadians who remember what I had said in my Good Friday address to the Nation. As you will recall, in that address on 13th April, when our Revolution was just one month old, we warned that the process of destabilization which the people and Government of Jamaica had gone through during 1975 and 1976 could soon begin in our own country.

Referring to that troubled and difficult period in Jamaica's history, I said the following, and I quote:

"Under this process the people of Jamaica were encouraged to lose faith and confidence in themselves, their government and their country and in the ability of their government to solve the pressing problems facing the country and meeting the expectations of their people. This was done through damaging news stories being spread in the local, regional and international media, particularly newspapers, aimed at discrediting the achievements of the Jamaican government. It was also done through violence and sabotage and by wicked and pernicious attempts at wrecking the economy through stopping the flow of tourist visitors, and hence the much needed foreign exchange earnings of the country."

Sisters and Brothers, destabilization is the name given the most recently developed (or newest) method of controlling and exploiting the lives and resources of a country and its people by a bigger and more powerful country through bullying, intimidation and violence. In the old days, such countries—the Colonialist and Imperialist powers—sent in gunboats or marines to directly take over the country by sheer force. Later on mercenaries were often used in place of soldiers, navy and marines.

Today more and more the new weapon and the new menace is destabilization. This method was used against a number of Caribbean and Third World countries in the 1960's, and also against Jamaica and Guyana in the 1970's. Now, as we predicted, it has come to Grenada.

Destabilization takes many forms—there is propaganda destabilization, when the foreign media, and sometimes our own Caribbean press, prints lies and distortions against us; there is economic destabilization, when our trade and our industries are sabotaged and disrupted; and there is violent destabilization, criminal acts of death and destruction, such as we have witnessed on Sunday night with the fires. All of these vicious tactics have been used before, in the recent past, in countries close to us, and in countries far away. As we, the people of Grenada show the world—clearly and unflinchingly—that we intend to remain free and independent—that we intend to consolidate and strengthen the principles and goals of our Revolution—as we show this to the world, there will be attacks upon us.

We must be ready to defend ourselves against these attacks. But to defend ourselves, we must know the enemy—for that is the best defence, the best preparation. The People's Revolutionary Army is diligent and on the alert, but the PRA and all the people of Grenada must know what to look for, what to expect

It is one thing to prepare against an attack by a band of cowardly mercenaries sent by Eric Gairy. It is easy to recognize this kind of enemy. But destabilization is a



different kind of enemy. It is much more subtle and much more deceptive. But it has a great weakness, a fatal flaw. Destabilization can only work when it goes unrecognized—like a thief in the night. Destabilization can work only when the people do not know that it is happening.

It is a total failure when it is exposed—and when the people see it for what it is. The people of Grenada must learn what this destabilization is—because then we cannot be fooled by it.

What is propaganda destabilization? You know the facts about Grenada—you know what is happening here. You know what the People's Revolutionay Government stands for. You know why we fought and what we are trying to do. You have known and been involved with our programs and our principles for many years. So what do you see when you look at a newspaper and see lies? What do you hear when you turn on a radio and hear news from other neighbouring countries which you know is not true? You are seeing destabilization; you are hearing destabilization. These are the lies printed and broadcast to try to destroy our revolution—your revolution.

Just in the past week there have been several different false, distorted and malicious stories about what is happening in Grenada appearing in different newspapers in Grenada, the Caribbean, Latin America and the world. During this period one newspaper claimed that there were several hundred Cubans living in Grenada and training the Comrades of our People's Revolutionary Army. Another report claimed that there were five thousand Cubans in Grenada. We have requested and will of course be happy to accept assistance from Cuba in any area in which we have needs, but as Grenadians living here you know these reports are lies.

Yet another of their ridiculous reports claimed that we have missiles in Grenada pointed at neighbouring islands in the region. And not satisfied, another news story claimed that there is a Russian submarine base in our sister island of Carriacou. Can you believe that? The people of Carriacou who are listening can surely expose this for the wicked and mountainous lie that it is! Another newspaper has claimed that there is a war going on in Grenada, that the country is a pitched camp and that several Cuban ships are at present tied up alongside our docks.

Five days ago we received a visit from a leading Economist and adviser to several Governments, who has very close contacts with individuals in the United States State Department. He advised us that he had received information from his contacts inside the State Department that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had drawn up a plan to turn back the Grenada Revolution. According to this person, the plan was drawn up in the shape of a Pyramid. At the bottom of the Pyramid was a plan to destabilize the country by planting false reports about Grenada in newspapers and on Radio stations, and also by encouraging prominent individuals, organisations and Governments in the region to attack our Revolution.

The first part of the plan was aimed at creating dissatisfaction and unrest among our people and at wrecking our Tourist industry and economy. A second level of the Pyramid involved the use of violence and arson in the country. And if neither of these two methods succeeded in destabilizing the country, then the plan was to move to the stage of assassinating the leadership of the country.

It is clear that the first and the second phases of this plan are already in operation. It is now up to us to ensure not only that the third stage is avoided but that we also take steps to crush the first and the second stages and move forward to build our Revolution in our own way. We must make sure that these tactics of destabilization do not succeed.

The two fires on Sunday, coming on the heel of the propaganda campaign outlined earlier, suggests that both stages one and two have already begun. Sisters and brothers, we are not a violent people, and when we see violence, we must look hard and deep to see whose hand is behind it. In Jamaica there was unleashed a flood of violence in 1976—to try to cause the defeat of Prime Minister Michael Manley. Guns appeared in the hands of thieves and gangs who never had guns before. Who was sending them these guns? Who was encouraging the violence? Certainly not the people of Jamaica. In Jamaica there was a terrible Orange Lane fire when dozens of innocent people were killed and hundreds left without homes. Who was responsible for the fire? Certainly not the people of Jamaica whom it hurt.



Just this week we have seen the same development in our country. One fire was set—deliberately and by admission—outside of town. And then, a few minutes later, when the fire trucks rushed to the first fire, another one broke out in the heart of town, a fire that could have destroyed a large part of town, a fire which endangered hundreds of lives, a fire which was undoubtedly caused by arson, as the comrades of the People's Revolutional Army and the firemen who went into the building came out smelling very strongly of kerosene. Fires planned by the enemies of Grenada tell us that we are dealing with a monster—with a soulless monster who would kill and destroy to create fear. Indeed we must note that the fires could both have a bad effect on the Tourist industry. This is so, because one of them occurred in the heart of the

tourist belt, and the other destroyed the building of the leading travel agency and tour operator in our country. As a matter of fact, we received information this morning that a tour operator in Barbados actually cancelled a trip to Grenada yesterday—apparently as a result of the fires.

But the people of Grenada must not be afraid; they must be vigilant. They must not be terrorized; they must be on guard. The people of Grenada will not be destabilized; we will not be fooled.

We must also remember that in the exercise of their disruptive activities, those hostile forces will always require local agents and local opportunists. The people should therefore not be surprised in the coming days, if they discover opportunist elements trying to foment unrest. One should always expect that there will be those who will rush to echo the propaganda lines being fed to them by forces whose objective it is to sabotage the gains made by the Revolution now and in the future.

In this present situation, what must the people do now? We suggest the following:

- (1) Report at your nearest recruiting station to join the People's Militia. We shall be opening a number of centres within the next three or four days. We believe that it is precisely our people in uniform and our people without uniform, represented by the People's Revolutionary Army and the People's Militia, who will be our best safeguards against terrorist activities and sabotage of our Revolution.
- (2) Phone up or otherwise contact the People's Revolutionary Army if you notice any suspicious behaviour or strange persons around the areas.
- (3) Keep your eyes on what is happening in the economy.

We stress yet again that never in history has there been such a humane and lenient Revolution. Freedom of the Press and all other freedoms have been fully protected and guaranteed by the Revolution. At the same time, no one must mistake our leniency for weakness, and no arsonists or saboteurs must expect any mercy from the people and the people in uniform—the People's Revolutionary Army. As a people we have made great sacrifices in the past. We have never succumbed to the violence of any bully. We shall not be bullied today. When people are conscious, when people are alert, when people are organised, and when people are prepared to fight, in a united way, they cannot lose. We have no doubt that in the same way that we were able to decisively defeat Gairy, we shall undoubtedly crush all of these attempts to disrupt and destabilize our country.

LONG LIVE THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT!

LONG LIVE FREE GRENADA!

LONG LIVE OUR REVOLUTION!

NEWS NOTES

Chinese Diverted Soviet Weapons from Vietnam

China's military preparations for its current war with Vietnam may be a decade older than has previously been thought, if once-classified information disclosed by a former U.S. intelligence officer is true.

Dr. Richard Harger, a professor of psychology at Jackson University since 1971, was an officer in Air Force intelligence during the war with Vietnam. Harger had been an instructor at the Armed Forces Air Intelligence Training Center. When President Lyndon Johnson ordered the escalation of U.S. involvement in the conflict, Harger was ordered to Saigon; he was stationed there from May 1965 through April 1966.

Harger's duties included flying more than 60 combat missions, many of them top secret bombing raids against Laos. He gave regular intelligence briefings to the Air Force commander-in-chief and senior staff officers on air operations in Indochina. After his tour of duty in Vietnam, Harger was stationed in Wiesbaden, Germany, at Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, where he was the key Southeast Asia intelligence analyst and briefer.

Eventually Harger became disenchanted with the U.S. involvement in Indochina, which he now characterizes as "aggressive and genocidal." He resigned his commission and as a civilian became an outspoken critic of the war effort. In 1975 he testified at a joint Congressional hearing in support of universal, unconditional amnesty for war resisters and deserters.

Even though Harger often gave public speeches against the war after he left the Air Force, he was unwilling, until recently, to divulge many of the secrets he learned as an intelligence officer. Now, however, Harger has broken his silence. He believes that the U.S. government has not learned the lessons of Vietnam, and he says the American people need to know the whole truth about the Pentagon's war preparations.

Harger says the secrets he knows are well-known to the other side. Details of weapons systems that inflict large-scale civilian casualties, or secret wars such as in Laos or Cambodia, are classified in order to prevent protest by Americans, not to protect vital U.S. interests from enemy spies, he says.

In a recent interview, Harger revealed that intelligence reports in the mid-1960's showed that the People's

Republic of China, supposedly an ally of North Vietnam at the time, was actually stealing weapons bound for Hanoi from the Soviet Union.



The SR-71 reconnaissance plane remains a key collector of intelligence for Air Force and other agencies.

"There was confirmation from photo reconnaissance and also from some sort of ground source intelligence that the People's Republic [of China] was taking the better weapons," he said. "The Chinese were reportedly taking the best weapons and letting the other stuff go through.

"So this made it necessary, if the Vietnamese were going to get the kind of weapons they needed to fight a sophisticated air force like the United States had, they had to rely on shipments that got into the port of Haiphong. I think I'm correct that almost all of the surface-to-air missiles that eventually got to North Vietnam came through the port of Haiphong, and if there were attempts to bring that kind of weaponry across mainland China, basically the Chinese were taking it for themselves."


Harger says he saw three or four intelligence reports supporting this. "They were isolated, sporadic reports. The thing I remember best is discussing it with my junior colleagues. The discussion really didn't go much further than, 'Hey, I thought the Chinese were supposed to be helping the Vietnamese in this war effort, and look what they're doing.' I can't remember briefing the commander-in-chief on this information."

He didn't consider it very important at the time. "I just realized that this is the way war goes. China and Vietnam have been traditional enemies for many centuries. It looks like they still don't trust one another much. It doesn't look like China's giving the kind of help they're trying to lead the international community to believe they're giving them."

Harger does not recall what level of classification or what estimate of reliability was given to these reports. "I always assumed it was reliable," he says. "No one I know ever challenged it. If you could get the documents from the Pentagon, you would find it basically confirmed."

Paisley Insurance Benefits Refused

In Bulletin Number 3 we remarked on the controversy over the body found in the Chesapeake Bay last September, identified by the CIA and the FBI as that of "former" Agency official John Paisley. Mrs. Paisley alleged that the body was not her husband's, and two insurance companies apparently agree. Both, according to the May 21, 1979 New York Times, have refused to pay her benefits on his life insurance (although the CIA has paid \$35,000). A Mutual of Omaha spokesman is quoted as saying, "We have a hunch he is still not only alive but is being held." They don't say by whom.



"Looks like ANOTHER CIA operative took his own life!"



"Believe It Or Not"—CIA Department

One of the most bizarre stories imaginable appeared in the March 15, 1979, Washington Post, and was promptly forgotten. The story was entitled "CIA Employee Jailed a Week in Mix-Up." According to the story, CIA officer William R. Hartley, 30, spent an entire week in an Alexandria, Virginia jail, mistaken for "a key figure in a huge West Texas marijuana smuggling ring."

Four witnesses identified his picture as a person involved in drug smuggling in New Mexico and Texas. A hotel register signed by the spotted man was signed "Bill Hartley." The suspect was believed to be a pilot, and sure enough, a William R. Hartley of Dallas had a pilot's

license. But Hartley had recently moved from Dallas to Virginia, and the CIA officer was tracked down and arrested. After one week—and it is a complete mystery why, if this was, as an official described it, "a doozy of a case of mistaken identity," he spent that week in jail—the case was quietly dropped in the Alexandria courthouse. Hartley had a wonderful alibi—the CIA said that at the time he was "spotted" in Texas he was attending an Agency "training course" outside of Washington.

It seems that there are two people named William Hartley, they both come from Texas, they both look remarkably alike, and they both have pilot's licenses. Only one works for the CIA and the other is a drug smuggler. Amazing.

Curiosity Might Kill Cats—But Not The CIA

So you thought the CIA's penchant for dirty tricks and domestic spying had ended after Watergate and the Church Committee exposes? Or upon the arrival at Langley as CIA Director of "Mr. Clean"—Admiral Stansfield Turner? Guess again.

The House Assassinations Committee discovered that its files of the physical evidence from the murder of President Kennedy had been tampered with in the summer of 1978—not by the janitorial staff or a prowling conspiracy theory freak, but by none other than a CIA "liaison officer" named Regis T. Blahut who had been assigned by the Agency to "help" the Committee. The Washington Post first broke the story on June 18th.

It seems that Blahut surreptitiously entered a room where he was not authorized to be without a Committee staff member. There, he opened the locked safe which held the critical items of evidence from Dallas, such as x-rays of the President's fatal wounds, autopsy photographs, and the famous "magic bullet" which allegedly passed through the President and Governor Connally virtually unscathed. Blahut's fingerprints were, according to one Committee source, "all over the place, on the photos, inside the safe, and on all sorts of different packages." A plastic sleeve in which the autopsy photos were kept inside a ring-binder notebook had been ripped out and the photos removed and examined. When he heard a noise outside the room, Blahut abruptly fled, leaving the materials in obvious disarray.

When pressed on the matter by the *Post*, the CIA admitted the involvement of Blahut, but said he had been dismissed after an "intensive internal investigation." CIA spokesman Herbert Hetu kept a straight face as he told the reporter, "We're satisfied that it was just a matter of curiosity [on Blahut's part]."

As part of the Agency's in-house counter-intelligence effort to solve (or cover-up?) the case, Blahut was given three lie-detector tests. According to one source: "He denied that he did it, and he flunked that. They also asked him whether anyone ordered him to do it. He said no, and he flunked that." One of Blahut's bosses, Scott Breckenridge of the CIA inspector general's office, was also supposed to take the test. Breckenridge, who wrote the CIA inspector general's 1967 report on the Agency's then-already numerous and multi-faceted schemes to kill Fidel Castro, and who was the Agency's top liaison officer with the Senate Intelligence Committee in its 1975-76 deliberations on the CIA and other intelligence agencies, retired recently. Any connection between his sudden retirement and the case of the curiosity-driven Blahut is of course purely coincidental.

When reached for comment, Blahut asserted that he had done no wrong. Admitting that his fingerprints were on the assassination evidence, he allowed that there was an "innocent explanation." He refused to disclose it, however. "There's other things that are involved that are detrimental to other things," he clarified, but again refused to clarify his clarification.

Persons close to the assassinations committee roundly challenged the CIA's defense on the case, saying "the circumstantial (evidence) is overwhelming" and that there was more than "curiosity" involved.



Parade Magazine Pulls Punches

The June 10, 1979, "Personality Parade" column in Parade Sunday supplemnt contained the following question: "Who is the CIA station chief in London? I know our intelligence man there used to be Cord Meyer. Who took his place?" Although the column's author, Walter Scott, seems able to answer anything, he begged off with this response: "Public exposure of CIA agents overseas generates considerable danger for these men and in many cases can limit their effectiveness. Sorry, but you must seek elsewhere for such information." We have sent the following letter to Parade:

Your column, Personality Parade, states, "Want the facts? Want to learn the truth. . . ?" Yet you refused to answer the query from F.E. of Carbondale, Ill. It is not true that public exposure of CIA agents overseas generates considerable danger for them. Thousands have been so exposed, and none have come to physical harm because of it.

In any event, you may be interested to know that Cord Meyer, Jr.'s successor as Chief of Station in London was exposed almost upon his arrival there in 1976. He was named in several British magazines and newspapers, and has been exposed in other books, papers and magazines in France and the United States. His full biography appears in *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, edited by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf.

He is Edward William Proctor, born December 30, 1920 in Rhode Island, and at present under cover as a "Political Attache" in the London Embassy. He joined the CIA in 1953, spending 17 years as an economist and five as Deputy Director for Intelligence, before moving into State Department cover in 1976. His identity is one of the worst-kept secrets in London journalistic circles.

We hope you will share this information with F.E., if you will not print it.

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
CIA Still After Head Doctors

Is the CIA's MK-ULTRA program still alive and well, or is this just a geniune effort to understand the behavior of inhabitants in Third World countries seeking to be sovereign and independent? We trust CAIB readers will know that by reprinting this advertisement which appeared in the April, 1979 American Psychological Association publication, APA Monitor, we are not endorsing it!

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AIFLD Moves Into Newspaper Field

The Newspaper Guild, a union of 35,000 working journalists in the United States, has begun a Latin American trade union training program funded by the American Institute for Free Labor Development. This has occurred despite acrimonious conflict within the union dating back to 1967, when several foundations which had given it about \$1 million for a fledgling Latin Amercan program refused to disclose their funding sources. (This was in the wake of the *Ramparts* expose that the National Student Association was being surreptitiously funded and used by the CIA.) Now the union has gone ahead with a new move, once more in Latin America.



The internal conflict over taking Government money still festers in the Guild. While the Executive Board agreed on the program in October of last year, the NG Middle Atlantic Council recently voted 23-4 to reject the funds, apparently due to its abiding doubts about the source of at least some of AIFLD's support and the known CIA connections of some top AIFLD officials.

In much of Latin America, journalists are strongly discouraged from writing anything that remotely ap-

proaches the truth about the repressive and dictatorial regimes where AIFLD programs are flourishing today. The Guild's international president, Charles A. Perlik, Jr. says the union should "do anything we can to help make newspaper people better at their jobs and to get a better reward for it." The Newspaper Guild at least pretends to journalists in those countries that it represents their aspirations for a truly free press, while helping to implement AIFLD's larger designs in the region—to manipulate and control the trade union movements and to keep them corralled in the orbit of American multinational corporations. As for the thousands of trade unionists imprisoned, tortured or disappeared, AIFLD (and now the Newspaper Guild) doesn't even bother to give them lip-service.

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PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

Wilkes, Owen, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Intelligence Installations in Norway: Their Number, Location, Function and Legality, International Peace Research Institute, Radhusgt. 4, Oslo, 1979. (A detailed and comprehensive look at technical intelligence operations based in Norway, involving not merely the Norwegian government, but all NATO countries, especially, of course, the United States. Much valuable technical information.)

American Friends Service Committee, *The Police Threat to Political Liberty*, AFSC, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102, 1979. (A well-documented look at local police surveillance of First Amendment activities and interrelations with FBI and LEIU, with recommendations for action. \$2.00 plus \$.48 postage.)

Peoples News Service, Oxford House, Derbyshire Street, London E2, United Kingdom. (A bi-weekly left-wing, non-sectarian news service with many news items not covered elsewhere; includes excellent research on intelligence-related issues. 10 issues, 2.50 pounds in Britain and Ireland, 3.10 pounds elsewhere; institutions, 10 pounds/year; 50 issues, 12 pounds in Britain and Ireland, 15 pounds elsewhere.)

Southern Africa, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010. (A monthly magazine focusing on the situation in southern Africa; excellent coverage not often found elsewhere. Year subscription \$10; institutions \$18. Airmail, South and Central America: \$19.50, Africa, Asia, Europe: \$22.50.

NAMING NAMES

Algeria

Allan B. Hemmings appears as of February 1979 as a case officer in Algiers, Algeria, with the cover positions of Third Secretary and commercial officer and the rank of R-6. From at least April 1975 till mid-1977 he was under cover as a consular officer at the Casablanca, Morocco Consulate General, with the rank R-7. As of August 1977 he was transferred to Algiers.

Austria

John J. O'Donnell, born August 16, 1941 in Pennsylvania, appears to be a mid-level case officer in Vienna, Austria. He first appears in State Department records as a consular assistant in Jerusalem, as of August 1967, with the grade S-7. In January 1968 he was promoted to S-6, and in June 1969 is found at the Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, as a language trainee at the Foreign Service Institute Field School. In August 1970 he was under cover as a consular officer at the San'a, Yemen Arab Republic Interests Section, advancing to S-5. In July 1972 he began as a political officer at the Beirut Embassy, now with the rank of R-6, advancing two years later to R-5. In November 1974 he was Second Secretary at the Cairo, Egypt Embassy, and in July 1977 was transferred to Vienna, as Second Secretary and in September 1978, he advanced again to R-4.

Brazil

Sheila K. O'Neill, born November 4, 1937 in Massachusetts is one of the few woman case officers in the CIA. She served from 1963 to 1970 as an "area analyst" for the Department of the Army, an obvious cover



''Secret! Secret! Read all about it.''

for her initial training, and in April 1970 appeared as a political assistant at the Montevideo, Uruguay Embassy, with the rating of S-4. In late 1972, she returned to Headquarters, as a GS-12, but in July 1973 appears at the Bogota, Colombia Embassy as a political officer, rate R-6. By October 1976, she had transferred to the Embassy in Brasilia, *Brazil* and in May 1978, was promoted to R-5. Though her cover position is not known, CAIB's source in Brasilia says that she is still there.

Colombia

In Bogota, Colombia, apparently a Deputy Chief of Station, is Thomas A. Brunton, a long-time Agency officer. Born March 10, 1929 in California, Brunton is listed as joining the Department of the Air Force as an analyst in 1964, after some 15 years' private experience including a college degree and teaching. In November 1964 he was assigned under cover as an Assistant Attache and political officer at the Lima, Peru Embassy, R-7. In July 1967 he was transferred to San Salvador, also as a political officer, advancing to R-6. After some time in Headquarters, advancing to R-5 in 1970 and later that year to GS-12 as a programs coordination officer at Headquarters, Brunton was transferred to Santiago, Chile in August 1971, advancing to R-4 in March 1975. After spending this critical period in Chile, there are no records of his postings until August 1976, when he was transferred to Bogota. He was apparently acting Chief of Station there until Martin C. Hawkins arrived in early 1979 (see below, under transfers). The recent intensification of repression in the country makes these CIA officers' role most critical at this time.

The other Deputy Chief of Station in Bogota, Colombia appears to be Donald K. Kanes. Kanes, born February 15, 1938 in New York, served from 1956 to 1964 as a "research analyst" for the Department of the Army, indicating that he has been with the Agency for some 23 years. After receiving a BS from Georgetown University in 1959, he next appears as a political officer at the Sao Paulo, Brazil Consulate General, with the grade of R-7. In June 1964 he became Vice-Consul and political officer, and in March 1966 moved to the office at Brasilia, Brazil, as Assistant Attache and, shortly thereafter, Vice-Consul. In April 1967 he advanced to R-6, and, the next year, returned to Headquarters. In March 1969 he advanced to R-5, and in May 1970 was detailed to the Foreign Service Institute. The next month he appeared as a political officer at the Caracas, Venezuela Embassy, where he remained until at least late 1973, after which there are no records of his whereabouts for a two-year period. In August 1975 he is found at the Brasilia Embassy as political officer with the grade R-4. In September 1977 he was transferred to Bogota, apparently sharing the role of Deputy Chief of Station with Brunton whose age would indicate that he is senior.

The CIA Chief of Station in New Delhi, India, if he has not yet been transferred, is Thomas Alan Twetten, Twetten, born March 31, 1935 in Iowa, is listed as having served as a "research analyst" for the Department of the Army from 1961 to 1962, when he was transferred to the Lagos, Nigeria Embassy as Assistant Attache and political officer with the grade R-7. In April 1966 he was transferred to the Benghazi, Libya Office, still a political officer, and advanced to R-6 in May 1966, and to R-5 in May 1968. In 1968 he returned to Headquarters, till April 1970, when he appeared as Second Secretary and political officer at the Accra, Ghana Embassy, with the grade R-4. In 1973 he returned again to Headquarters, advanced to R-3 in 1976, and, in August of that year, moved to New Delhi, ostensibly as First Secretary, but in fact Chief of Station.

Lebanon

Frank R. Anderson is a case officer in Beirut, Lebanon, with the cover title of Second Secretary and Consul, and the grade of R-5. Anderson, born February 1, 1942 in Illinois, shows varied private experience from 1959 to 1968, when, after receiving a BA from the University of Illinois, he became a "researcher" for the Department of Defense. In June 1969 he is found at the Beirut Embassy detailed for Arabic language training, with the rate of S-6. In August 1971 he was assigned to the Embassy at Tripoli, Libya, as consular officer, where he served until March 1974, becoming an economic-commercial officer with the rate of S-5 in May 1973. In March 1974 he appears in the records as a consular officer in San'a, Yemen Arab Republic, with the grade R-6, advancing to R-5 in February 1976. At least as of May 1977 he appears back in Beirut, this time as Second Secretary and Consul.

Libya

A woman case officer—fairly rare in the extremely sexist CIA—has been found in Tripoli, Libya. She is Mary Cynthia Smoot, born October 20, 1949 in Washington, D.C. She served under cover with the Department of Defense as an "analyst" from 1970 to 1971, when she moved to State Department cover as an R-7. In January 1972 she was posted to Naples, Italy as a visa officer. In 1975 she was back at Headquarters, now R-6, and in March 1976 became an S-4. As of January 1978 she was in Tripoli, as Attache and Consul. She was there at least as late as April of this year.

Mozambique

The Chief of Station in Maputo, Mozambique, is James D. Smith, Jr. Little is known about Smith, other than that he was at Headquarters as of March 1977, with the grade R-5, before being transferred a few months later to Maputo, with the cover title of Second Secretary. As of April 1979, he assumed the additional job description of political officer.

Headquarters

Smith replaced Frederick L. Wettering, who is now back at Headquarters as one of the two CIA members within the

Interagency Ethiopia Working Group. Wettering, born July 5, 1939 in Illinois, spent from 1962 to 1965 under cover as a Department of the Army "area analyst." In July 1965 he commenced State Department cover, as an economic officer, R-7, at the Salisbury, Rhodesia Embassy. He returned to Headquarters in 1967, advanced to R-6, and in May 1969 appeared as economic-commercial officer at the Zanzibar, Tanzania Consulate. He moved up to R-5, and in August 1972 was Second Secretary and political officer at the Nairobi, Kenya Embassy. In 1974 he returned to Headquarters, and at least as of April 1975 was serving in Lourenco Marques (now Maputo).

The other CIA member in the Interagency Ethiopia Working Group is Samuel L. Martin. Martin, born March 31, 1937, served under cover as an economic-commercial officer in the Benghazi, Libya Office from 1970 to 1972, as an R-5. After two years back at Headquarters, he appeared as of October 1974 in the Political Section of the Kinshasa, Zaire Embassy, in the office of the Chief of Station. No other State Department records can be found, covering the period between June 1976 and January 1979, but as of at least February of this year he joined the Interagency Ethiopia Working Group.

Singapore

Edward S. Juchniewicz, born June 4, 1930 in New Jersey, is a senior case officer in Singapore. After six years in the Marine Corps, he was with the Department of the Army from 1953 to 1963, indicating that he has been with the Agency since the beginning of that cover. In July 1963 he was an economic assistant at the Bern, Switzerland Embassy, S-6, becoming R-6 the next year, Attache later in 1964, and Second Secretary in March 1965. Two months later he returned to Headquarters, advancing to R-5 a year later, and, in July 1967 was transferred to Warsaw, Poland, as political officer. In April 1970 he made R-4, and later that year was transferred to the Tokyo, Japan Embassy as economic-commercial officer, and, shortly thereafter, as political-military affairs officer. As of November 1974 he is found back at Headquarters, and by April 1978 had been transferred with his wife, Janet Zacherek, as an Attache in the Singapore Embassy, though he is evidently Chief of Station, replacing Eleazer Andrews Williams.

South Africa

In the last issue of CovertAction, we noted that the Chief of Station in South Africa was Dorwin M. Wilson. We have since learned that Wilson has left South Africa, possibly retiring. The new Chief of Station appears to be Gerry Francis Gossens, born October 26, 1933, in Texas. Gossens is listed as having had various unspecified private experience from 1959 to 1967, evidently deep cover work, perhaps with proprietaries. In October 1967 he appears as a general foreign service officer, R-6, at the Kinshasa, Congo Embassy, and in May 1969, as a political officer at the Lumumbashi consulate in the same country. In June 1970 he was detailed to Headquarters, advancing to R-5 in May 1971, and the next month appears as a consular officer at the Conakry, Guinea Embassy. The next record found places him at the Pretoria Embassy as of July 1978, apparently shortly before Wilson left and Gossens replaced him.



Switzerland

A very senior Agency officer, James Richard Fees, has been located at the Geneva, Switzerland Mission, although his cover position is not known at this time. Fees, born September 21, 1931 in Nebraska, apparently entered the Agency in 1955, as a "plans analyst" for the Department of the Army. After extended university studies from 1955 to 1959 at George Washington University, Notre Dame, and Georgetown University, he took State Department cover in 1960, as an Assistant Attache at the Khartoum, Sudan Embassy, R-7. He returned briefly to Headquarters, and was at the Taiz, Yemen Embassy from 1963 to 1966, as a consular officer, first as Attache, then Vice-Consul, then Second Secretary, advancing through R-6 and R-5. From 1967 to 1970 he was at the Amman, Jordan Embassy. as a political officer, advancing to R-4 and then switching to S-2. In June 1974, after several years again at Headquarters, he became Chief of Station in Cairo, Egypt, an extremely high position. As of November 1978, he turned up in Geneva.

Syria

Richard D. Calder, born December 3, 1942 in New York arrived in the Damascus, Syria Embassy as of January 1979. He served overseas for two years with the U.S. Navy, and joined the CIA in 1965 as a "communications" officer. The Agency sent him to school (the University of Connecticut), where he got a BA degree in 1971, and then he returned to Headquarters for more training under cover as an "area analyst." In February 1974 he was assigned under Department of State cover to the Foreign Service Institute for language training, with an R-8 rating. In September of the same year, he was sent to the FSI Field Language School in Beirut, Lebanon for additional training. Records indicate that his first posting under diplomatic cover was in about September 1976, when he was assigned to the Embassy in Jidda, Saudi Arabia. In February 1978, he moved out of the cellar (R-8 is the lowest R rating) to become an R-7, and nearly a year after was sent with his wife, Carol Pedini, to his present assignment in Damascus.

United Kingdom

An experienced case officer now in London, *United Kingdom*, is *Gerald Lloyd Engle*, born December 10, 1935, in Michigan. Engle served in the familiar cover position as an "area analyst" for the Department of the Army from 1962 to 1965, when, in May, he appears as Attache and economic officer at the Bern, Switzerland Embassy, rate R-7. Later that year he became Third Secretary and,

in May 1968 advanced to R-6. In July 1969 he returned to Headquarters and, in April 1970, became an R-5. In August 1970 he is found as a consular officer at the Sofia, Bulgaria Embassy, and two years later returned to Headquarters for foreign language training. In August 1973 he was an administrative officer at the Moscow, U.S.S.R. Embassy, transferring to S-3 in May 1975. At least as of December 1978, he became an Assistant Political Attache at the London Embassy at which point he has been joined by his wife, Mary Riley.

West Germany

A well-known CIA veteran, Stuart E. Methven, has recently been discovered in the Bonn, West Germany Embassy. Methven has been with the Agency since at least 1952, when he commenced seven years under cover as an "administrative assistant" with the Department of the Army. From 1959 until at least 1962 he served with the International Cooperation Administration, the predecessor of AID, in Vientiane, Laos. No Department of State records reveal his whereabouts from 1962 till 1969, when he became Chief of Station in Jakarta, Indonesia, under cover as a political officer, R-5. In late 1973, now R-3, he returned to Headquarters, until late 1974, when he assumed his most notorious post, Chief of Station in Kinshasa, Zaire, where he directed the CIA's massive paramilitary and propaganda operation in Angola. Further sources place him in Bonn as of at least July 1977.

Zaire


Replacing him as Chief of Station in Kinshasa, Zaire is another old timer, Victor Masao Matsui, born June 2, 1923 in California. Matsui also joined the Agency in 1952, spending five years under cover with the Department of the Army. In June 1957 he moved to State Department cover, as an Attache at the Phnom Penh, Cambodia Embassy, R-5. From 1959 to 1960 he was at the Cairo Embassy, returning to Headquarters for two years, before being transferred to the Karachi, Pakistan Embassy, where, in 1963, he became Second Secretary. In September 1965 he became Chief of Station at Tananarive, Madagascar, where he remained until returning again to Headquarters in 1968. In 1970 he became Chief of Station in Abidian, Ivory Coast, with the cover title of First Secretary, now an R-3. From 1973 to 1975 he was again at Headquarters, and no records have been found covering the next two years. In September 1977 he appears as chief of Station in Kinshasa.

Transfers

Two people, whose detailed biographies are given in "Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe" have been located in new assignments.

Martin C. Hawkins, as noted above, is no longer in Guayaquil, Ecuador, but is now the Chief of Station in Bogota, Colombia.

Suzanne E. Ziemer arrived at least as of February 1979 at the Budapest, Hungary Embassy, probably as "consul."



DIRTY WORK

The CIA In Western Europe

Edited by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf

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CovertAction Exclusive:

AIFLD GRADUATE DISCUSSES FRONT ROYAL COURSE

The CovertAction Information Bulletin has met with a graduate of the infamous trade union leadership course of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, given periodically at the Institute's Front Royal, Virginia, center. Our informant, then an aspiring trade unionist from a small Latin American country, must remain anonymous, but his brief description which follows is nevertheless most illuminating:

Front Royal, 75 miles west of Washington, hosts the American Institute for Free Labor Development, an offshoot of the AFL-CIO, offering training courses to Latin American and Caribbean labor leaders. I attended such a course in 1976. The officials of the Institute say that the training provided is intended to help the growth of unions in the Third World, and to help those unions be "democratic" and free of outside influences.

My assessment, after the seven-week course, is that it exists, in fact, to monitor union activities in the Third World through its participants, to praise capitalism, and rabidly to condemn communism.

All participants are asked, after completion of all the courses, to submit written reports on their activities in their home countries. The uses to which these reports are put can only be imagined. That they are routinely turned over to US intelligence agencies is obvious.

The lecturers spend an inordinate amount of time not discussing the mechanics of labor unions, but condemning progressive labor leaders around the world, as well as progressive and especially socialist governments. The capitalist system is never questioned, much less condemned, by any lecturer. Many of the lecturers have spent some time in one communist country or another, and constantly use this as the basis of an ongoing anticommunist campaign which permeates the courses.

Most of the courses have nothing to do with one's home situation, and they never touch upon the difficulties of the working class in the United States, or upon such things as racism or sexism. The lecturers act as spies, constantly observing the participants and reporting on their attitudes. Of course, participants who appear suitably brainwashed by the program are later brought back to the Institute for further "training."

Almost all of the lecturers are AFL-CIO officials, or AIFLD staff members, but my lecturers included, for example, direct from Miami, Florida, the "President" of the Cuban Telephone Workers Federation in Exile. The first lecture, after the welcoming luncheon, was entitled. "The Open Society and the Closed Society." The final set of classes was entitled, "Safeguarding the Democratic Labor Movement." This included: "The Extremist Challenge in Latin America"; "Countering Extremist Offensives"; "Recognition and Analysis of Extremist Propaganda": "Safeguarding and Defending Meetings, Parades and Demonstrations from Extremist Attacks"; "Recognition of and Defense Against Infiltration and Front Organizations"; and "The Formation of Democratic Forces."

The irony of being taught about left-wing "front organizations" by one of the most notorious rightwing front organizations in the United States was unfortunately lost on most of the participants. Nor was there any recognition of the obvious fact that strong union movements have historically been attacked from the right, not from the left.

In summary, the AIFLD course is nothing but a session in brainwashing anti-communism, designed to protect US interests in the home countries of the participants. It is only by mistake or accident that progressive labor leaders will be invited to Front Royal, but those who do attend must unhesitatingly expose this joke.

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